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This work presents a systematic process for building a Fault Diagnoser (FD), based on Petri Nets (PNs) which has been applied
to a small helicopter. This novel tool is able to detect both intermittent and permanent faults. The work carried out is discussed
from theoretical and practical point of view. The procedure begins with a division of the whole system into subsystems, which
are the devices that have to be modeled by using PN, considering both the normal and fault operations. Subsequently, the models
are integrated into a global Petri Net diagnoser (PND) that is able to monitor a whole helicopter and show critical variables to
the operator in order to determine the UAV health, preventing accidents in this manner. A Data Acquisition System (DAQ) has
been designed for collecting data during the flights and feeding PN diagnoser with them. Several real flights (nominal or under
failure) have been carried out to perform the diagnoser setup and verify its performance. A summary of the validation results
obtained during real flight tests is also included. An extensive use of this tool will improve preventive maintenance protocols for
UAVs (especially helicopters) and allow establishing recommendations in regulations.
1. Introduction
The growth in number and complexity of Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS) missions within civil frameworks is signifi-
cant. Nevertheless, there is an enormous gap between large
and expensive military systems that are able to board redun-
dant equipment and complete health monitoring systems
and small, light, and inexpensive commercial aircrafts. Thus,
although there are several initiatives aiming at including the
UAVs in the nonsegregated air space by using a unique Aerial
TrafficManagement (ATM) system, these approaches are not
affordable for small commercial units. For this reason, during
the last years, different organizations [1] have contributed
with outstanding efforts to create a necessary regulatory
framework that allows integrating small UASwithin everyday
activities. According to these efforts, some researchers [2]
involved in UAS operations are concerned not only about the
frequency and incidence of accidents caused by UAS failures
but also about of surveillance and safety of the population.
Moreover, few attempts have been made in Europe for
identifying their causes, including them into the regulation
to define and standardize the foundations and routines for
the use of UAS in order to decrease the percentages of failure.
In addition, according to the report about data reliability of
UAVs in military field of the United States [3], UAVs are
highly vulnerable to unforeseen situations of the equipment
devices (control station and aircraft) and operating environ-
ment where they are tested.
Althoughmultirotor systems (e.g., quadrotors and hexro-
tors) have recently broken into the market in the category
of mini-UAVs due to their simplicity, helicopters are still the
most frequent option when hovering maneuvers are required
in the mission, mainly due to their higher payload capability
with respect to the multirotor systems.
Remotely piloted helicopters are inherently unstable with
fast dynamics. They do not have the graceful degradation
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properties of fixed-wing aircrafts or airships in case of
failures. Even when stability augmentation devices are used,
a skilled pilot is required to control them during flight.
Therefore, a helicopter (HC) has been used for this research,
considering that helicopters are the most complex platform
from the mechanical point of view. Hence, a failure in any
part of the autonomous helicopter (i.e., sensors, actuators, or
control system) can lead to a dangerous situation.
The motivation behind our work is to collect data about
the behavior of the helicopter flying in normal and fault
conditions, whichwill provide the foundations for developing
strategies of FDI that will allow to prevent the aircraft from
accidents. Thus, the main contribution of this work is to
report how to develop an FD tool based on PN, capable
of detecting permanent and intermittent faults. Moreover,
the procedure presented in this work illustrates how the
thresholds of each variable have been established, for both
normal and fault conditions.
Although initially the tool has been used for FD in UAS,
in the near future, it can be applied to any kind of system.
FDI techniques have been widely applied in process industry
[4, 5]. Some approaches can also be found in the field of UAS
to detect faults in sensors and actuators. Thus, Fault Tolerant
Control (FTC) techniques or Fault Detection Isolation and
Recovery (FDIR) techniques are required if a fault is detected.
In these cases, the structure of the controller has to be
changed to get the best possible response of the system,
since the system cannot be stopped. FD techniques applied
to UAS are commonly based on analytical model approaches,
signal processing based approaches, and knowledge based
approaches [6]
Analytical model-based FD approaches make use of
mathematical models. Moreover, helicopters exhibit complex
dynamics, whichmakes it difficult to create high fidelitymod-
els able to detect small deviations or abnormal functioning.
Nevertheless, fault isolation observers for square and non-
square linear systems can be found in the literature [7]. They
provide the observer with a design that ensures the stability
and minimizes the influence of disturbances on the residuals
at the same time. Other approaches such as the Unknown
Input Observer (UIO) designed by Liu et al. [8] aiming at
tracking actuator fault parameters and decoupling the effect
of faults and unknown inputs are valuable contributions.
Moreover, Qi et al. [9, 10] propose states and parameters com-
bined estimation based on square-root Unscented Kalman
Filter (UKF) and Kalman Filter- (KF-) based adaptive UKF
with a full nonlinearmodel of an unmanned helicopter (UH).
The KF-based adaptive UKF is composed of two parallel
master-slave filters. The KF-based adaptive UKF is simpler
and more effective than UKF estimation method.
Signal processing based methods are developed on the
basis of thorough analyses of the failuremechanisms to deter-
mine signal characteristics that can represent failures. A novel
wavelet-based approach to detect an abrupt sensor fault in a
UH system is presented in [11], accurately localizing the char-
acteristics of a signal (time and frequency domains) and the
occurring instants of abnormal status of a sensor in the output
signal, whereas an experimental validation of wavelet-based
analytical redundancy technique on a 3-degree-of-freedom
UH platform is presented in [12]; the technique successfully
detects a fault of small magnitude, consisting of a 10%
reduction in the pitch sensor gain. Furthermore, a technique
for detecting the faults bymeasuring the rate of change of data
with respect to time is applied in [13].
On the other hand, knowledge based FD approaches
require a deep cognition of the entire process, acquired
typically during the operation of the system.Thus, the knowl-
edge allows avoiding the reliance on accurate mathematical
models. For instance, an adaptive threshold Neural Network
scheme for UH sensor failure diagnosis is presented in [14],
the adaptive threshold approach eliminates the need for
thresholds changing with flight conditions.
Previous works as [15], applied to fault diagnosis of
Discrete Events Systems (DES), use Regular Languages, State
Graphs, or Finite State Machines (FSMs) for modeling the
knowledge. These techniques highlight a main drawback,
which is the combinational explosion that makes their
elaboration difficult when the number of the components
increases. Another approach [16] applies the concepts of
marking and justification. This allows performing diagnosis
without performing an exhaustive enumeration of the states.
An evolution of this work can be found in [17], where
interpreted Petri Nets are used to model the system, taking
advantage of the power of the PNs by making a better use
of their mathematical basis. A generalization of the problem
that uses a centralized diagnosis solution for diagnosing
a distributed system can be found in [18]. This method
known as Diagnoser Approach splits the net into modules
that may share places, which are called “bordered places.” A
communication system connects the different modules and
updates the diagnosis information.
Considering fault diagnosis applied to Hybrid Systems, a
hybrid integration of discrete and continuous FD techniques
can be found in [19], where hybrid automata, timed Petri
Nets, fault trees, and signal processing techniques are inte-
grated in a single tool.
Petri Nets are a well-known method for implementing
Fault Diagnosers due to their capability to manage concur-
rence. They allow representing either small or large systems.
A large number of references can be found in the literature
[20–22].
Among the different types of PNs, interpreted PN is the
most adequate to represent the model of a system [23, 24].
This work is a useful guide to close the gap between
the theory and a real application, and this is one of the
most important contributions of the work, since it shows a
complete methodology to build a diagnoser of a complex
system based on interpreted PN.Moreover, the work includes
real data validation in UAV applications, which has not been
previously found in the literature.
The present Petri Net diagnoser is able to detect not only
permanent but also intermittent failures avoiding combina-
tional explosion problems. Furthermore, flexible architecture
of the PND allows including additional devices to the model.
The tool can be used in different areas of engineering
(industrial process, Robotics, etc.).
Section 2 summarizes the basis of Petri Nets, neces-
sary for understanding the models in the process of fault
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diagnosis. Section 3 describes the methodology for building
the model and the diagnoser, starting with the models of the
components for each subsystem and ending with a unique
PN as diagnoser. Section 4 shows the results when applying
the diagnoser to a radio control helicopter considering both
normal and fault operations. Finally, the conclusions of the
work are presented in Section 5, analyzing different options
for future work.
2. Petri Nets
Petri Nets (PNs) are a graphical and mathematical modeling
tool that has been widely applied, especially in the field of
automation.They allow describing concurrent, parallel, asyn-
chronous, distributed, and not deterministic systems by using
marks to simulate the dynamics and concurrency activities.
From mathematical point of view, PNs manage either state
equations, algebraic equations, or some other kind of models
that can govern the behavior of systems. An excellent refer-
ence of the theory that applies to Petri Nets can be found in
[25].
A Petri Net (PN) has two types of nodes, namely, places
and transitions. A place (𝑃) is represented by a circle and a
transition (𝑇) by a bar. Places and transitions are connected
by arcs. The number of places and transitions is finite and
not zero. An arc is directed and connects either a place to a
transition or a transition to a place. In other words, a PN is
a bipartite graph; that is, places and transitions alternate on a
path made up of consecutive arcs.
Definition 1. An unmarked ordinary PN is a quadruple 𝑄 =
⟨𝑃, 𝑇,Pre,Post⟩ such that
𝑃 = {𝑃
1
, 𝑃
2
, . . . , 𝑃
𝑛
} is a finite, nonempty set of places;
𝑇 = {𝑇
1
, 𝑇
2
, . . . , 𝑇
𝑚
} is a finite, nonempty set of tran-
sitions;
𝑃 ∩ 𝑇 = 0; that is, the sets 𝑃 and 𝑇 are disjointed;
Pre : 𝑃 × 𝑇 → {0, 1} denotes the input incidence
application;
Post : 𝑇 × 𝑃 → {0, 1} denotes the output incidence
application.
Pre(𝑃
𝑖
, 𝑇
𝑗
) characterizes the weight of the arc 𝑃
𝑖
→ 𝑇
𝑗
.
Thus, the weight is 1 if the arc exists and 0 if not. Conversely,
Post(𝑃
𝑖
, 𝑇
𝑗
) denotes the weight of the arc 𝑇
𝑗
→ 𝑃
𝑖
.
The following notations will be used:
∘𝑇
𝑗
= {𝑃
𝑖
∈ 𝑃 | Pre(𝑃
𝑖
, 𝑇
𝑗
) > 0} is set of input places
of 𝑇
𝑗
;
𝑇𝑜
𝑗
= {𝑃
𝑖
∈ 𝑃 | Post(𝑃
𝑖
, 𝑇
𝑗
) > 0} is set of output places
of 𝑇
𝑗
;
∘
𝑃
𝑖
= {𝑇
𝑗
∈ 𝑇 | Pre(𝑃
𝑖
, 𝑇
𝑗
) > 0} is set of input
transitions of 𝑃
𝑖
;
𝑃𝑜
𝑗
= {𝑃
𝑖
∈ 𝑃 | Post(𝑃
𝑖
, 𝑇
𝑗
) > 0} is set of output
transitions of 𝑃
𝑖
.
Definition 2. A marked PN is a pair 𝑅 = ⟨𝑄,𝑚
0
⟩ in which 𝑄
is an unmarked PN and𝑚
0
an initial marking.The validation
conditions can be expressed in the following way: transition
𝑇
𝑗
is enabled for amarking𝑚
𝑘
if𝑚
𝑘
(𝑃
𝑖
) ≥ Pre(𝑃
𝑖
, 𝑇
𝑗
) for every
𝑃
𝑖
∈ ∘𝑇
𝑗
.
The reachability set of the PN is the set of all marked
reachable from 𝑚
0
, activating only enabled transitions; this
set is denoted byR⟨𝑄,𝑚
0
⟩. A sequence of transitions firing of
a PN (𝑄,𝑚
0
) is a sequence of transition 𝑆 = 𝑇
𝑖
, 𝑇
𝑗
, . . . , 𝑇
𝑘
. . .,
such that𝑚
0
𝑇𝑖
󳨀→ 𝑚
1
𝑇𝑗
󳨀→ 𝑚
𝑥
𝑇𝑘
󳨀󳨀→.The set of all firing sequences
is called the languageL(𝑄,𝑚
0
):
L (𝑄,𝑚
0
)
= {𝑆 = 𝑇
𝑖
, 𝑇
𝑗
, . . . , 𝑇
𝑘
. . . ∧ 𝑚
0
𝑇𝑖
󳨀→ 𝑚
1
𝑇𝑗
󳨀→ 𝑚
𝑥
𝑇𝑘
󳨀→} .
(1)
2.1. Interpreted Petri Nets. Among the different types of PN
(interpreted and colored), this research work deals with the
interpreted Petri Nets (IPNs) mainly due to their features
such as synchronization, timed places, and a part for process-
ing data.
The inputs are associated with the transitions and outputs
are associated with places. As Figure 1 illustrates, the event
𝐸
𝑗
and condition 𝐶
𝑗
are associated with transition 𝑇
𝑗
. Thus,
condition 𝐶
𝑗
is a Boolean function that depends on both the
data processing part and the environment. Event 𝐸
𝑗
is either
an external event derived from the environment or the always
occurring event 𝑒. Transition 𝑇
𝑗
will be activated as follows.
If transition𝑇
𝑗
is enabled and if condition𝐶
𝑗
is true, when
event 𝐸
𝑗
occurs.
The product 𝑅
𝑗
= 𝐸
𝑗
⋅ 𝐶
𝑗
is called the receptivity of
transition𝑇
𝑗
. Actions denoted in the figure𝑂∗
𝑖
, 𝐵∗
𝑖
, and𝐴
𝑖
are
associated with place 𝑃
𝑖
. When a token is deposited in place
𝑃
𝑖
, at instant 𝑡, the operation𝑂∗
𝑖
is carried out and the impulse
action 𝐵∗
𝑖
is sent to the environment. The Boolean output 𝐴
𝑖
has the Boolean value 1 as long as there is a token in 𝑃
𝑖
.
A control interpreted Petri Net exhibits the following five
characteristics.
Necessary characteristics are as follows:
(1) It is synchronized on external events and stable.
(2) It is safe (𝑚
0
= 1).
(3) It is deterministic (no conflict).
Frequent characteristics are as follows:
(4) It relies on a data processing part, whose state is
defined by a set of variables 𝑉 = {𝑉
1
, 𝑉
2
, . . .}.
This state is modified by operations 𝑂∗
𝑖
, which are
associated with the places. It determines the value of
the predicates 𝐶0
𝑗
.
(5) It receives Boolean information 𝐶𝑒
𝑗
from the ambient.
It sends level actions 𝐴
𝑖
(Booleans) and impulse
actions 𝐵∗
𝑖
(event type), associated with the places, to
the environment.
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Figure 1: Control interpreted Petri Net.
3. Building Process of Model and
FD Diagnoser
Let 𝑅 = (𝑃, 𝑇,Pre,Post, 𝑚
0
) be the PN that represents the
model of the system to diagnose, where both normal and
fault operation are considered. Moreover, transitions 𝑇 can
be classified as unobservable 𝑇
𝑢𝑜
and observable 𝑇
𝑜
, as 𝑇 =
𝑇
𝑜
∪𝑇
𝑢𝑜
. Observable transitions are those transitions that are
activated by control events 𝑇
𝐶
(command supervisor) or the
instrumentation deployed in the process 𝑇
𝑆
. Therefore, 𝑇
𝑜
=
𝑇
𝐶
∪ 𝑇
𝑆
. On the other hand, not observable transitions are
those that are not detected by the system when they happen.
Thus, fault transitions 𝑇
𝑓
are a subset of the unobservable
transitions 𝑇
𝑓
⊆ 𝑇
𝑢𝑜
. 𝑇
𝑓
can be classified into disjointed sets,
corresponding to different types of failure that may occur in
the system, consequently 𝑇
𝑓
= 𝑇
𝑓1
∪ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∪ 𝑇
𝑓𝑁
. 𝑁 denotes
the number of components of the system. According to this,
when a 𝐹
𝑖
type fault occurs, a transition of set 𝑇
𝑓𝑖
will be
activated. Faults distribution Π
𝑓
defines the faults set to be
evaluated in the system.
This section summarizes the procedure for modeling and
diagnoser designing. As previously mentioned, the system is
made up of several subsystems working together and sharing
different functionalities. Consequently, they are linked by
several dependence relationships.
Step 1 (to divide the system into subsystems). The system
𝐻 can be split into 𝑀 subsystems with close relationships
among them, depending on their performance. Thus 𝐻 =
𝐻
1
∪ 𝐻
2
∪ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∪ 𝐻
𝑀
.
Step 2 (to build up the PN model of the components of each
subsystem). Let 𝑅𝑖
𝑗
= (𝑃
𝑖
, 𝑇
𝑖
,Pre,Post, 𝑚
0
) be themarked PN
of the 𝑖-component belonging to 𝑗 subsystem, 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁
𝑗
,
with 𝑁
𝑗
being the number of components in the subsystem
𝑗. 𝑃
𝑖
is a set of places, 𝑇
𝑖
is a set of transitions, Pre/Post are
the input/output incidence applications, and 𝑚
0
is the initial
marked.
Step 3 (operation of integration). The following notation
will be used to denote the integration operation for the
subsystem 𝑗: 𝑄𝑗 = (𝑃𝑗, 𝑇𝑗, P̃re𝑗, P̃ost𝑗, ̃𝑚𝐽
0
). Therefore, 𝑄𝑗
refers to the representation of the subsystem behavior 𝐻
𝑗
through of a stand-alone PN model, which includes 𝑁
𝑗
different PN models corresponding to its components. Since
this model integrates the normal and fault behavior of the
system, transitions (observable 𝑇
𝑜
and unobservable 𝑇
𝑢𝑜
) can
occur from any place of the model. Let 𝑃𝑗 and 𝑇𝑗 be the sets
of places and transitions of 𝑄𝑗 of the 𝑗 subsystem, composed
by the union of place and transitions of the components,
respectively, as follows:
𝑃𝑗 =
𝑁
⋃
𝑖=1
𝑃
𝑖
,
𝑇𝑗 =
𝑁
⋃
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑖
.
(2)
The following process has to be completed to build the
integration model.
Step 3.1. Define the set of faults 𝐹 for each component of the
subsystem:
𝐹 = {𝐹
1
, 𝐹
2
, . . . , 𝐹
𝑁
} . (3)
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Step 3.2 (define the initial place 𝑝𝑗
0
). It brings the initial places
of each component of the subsystem together:
𝑝
𝑗
0
= 𝑝
1
0
, 𝑝
2
0
, . . . , 𝑝
𝑁
0
. (4)
Step 3.3 (assign a mark to initial place 𝑝𝑗
0
). It defines the
starting point for the evolution of the subsystem represented.
Step 3.4 (build the branch corresponding to normal condi-
tions 𝑅𝑗
𝑁
). It designates the interaction and evolution of the
components. Transitions are merely composed by controller
commands 𝑇
𝐶
. The set of places of the subsystem is made up
of the places of each component.
Step 3.5 (add the faults places 𝑃𝑗
𝑓
). A place for each fault from
the set 𝐹 has to be generated.
Step 3.6 (add the transitions faults 𝑇𝑗
𝑓
). From each place 𝑝𝑗
𝑖
of
general PN, a fault transition 𝑡𝑗
𝑓
is therefore added:
∀𝑝
𝑗
𝑖
: 𝑝
𝑖
∈ 𝑃
𝑗
󳨀→ ∃(𝑝
𝑖
, 𝑡
𝑗
) ∈ 𝐹. (5)
Step 3.7. Connect the normal places 𝑝𝑗
𝑖
to the fault transitions
𝑡
𝑗
𝑓
and the faults transitions 𝑡𝑗
𝑓
to the faults places 𝑝𝑗
𝑓
by using
arcs.
Step 4 (refine the general model). It is necessary to consider
only the observable part of general model 𝑄𝑗; therefore,
𝑄𝑗 = (𝑃𝑗, 𝑇𝑗, P̃re𝑗, P̃ost𝑗, ̃𝑚𝑗
0
)must be transformed to refined
model 𝑄𝑗 = (𝑃𝑗, 𝑇𝑗,Pre𝑗,Post𝑗, 𝑚𝑗
0
). It is only made up of
observable transitions and places. According to this, fault
transitions have to be replaced by readings of the sensor 𝑇
𝑆
.
The following process must be followed to refine the model.
Step 4.1 (identify the sensors of the system). Each subsystem
has𝑁𝑠
𝑗
sensors.
Step 4.2 (build a discrete set of the sensors outputs). 𝑌 rep-
resents the number of combinations of the sensors readings.
Hence, 𝑌 are the inputs for the sensors integration table.
Consider |𝑌| = 2𝑁𝑠. See first column (with “∗”) of Table 1.
Step 4.3 (define the outputs of the integration table). An
output (column) in the sensors integration table is added for
each branch of normal conditions in PN for each subsystem.
Each place represents the current state of sensors readings, as
first row (†) in Table 1 depicts.
Step 4.4 (build the sensors integration table). Consider ℎ
𝑗
=
?̃? → 𝑌
𝑗
, 𝑙 = 1, . . . ,𝑀, where 𝑌
𝑗
denotes the discrete set of
sensor outputs possible of subsystem 𝑗; it defines
𝑌 =
𝑁
∏
𝑖=1
𝑌
𝑗
. (6)
The integration sensor table ℎ
𝑗
is defined by ℎ(𝑃) =
(ℎ
1
(𝑃
𝑗
), ℎ
2
(𝑃
𝑗
), . . . , ℎ
𝑁
(𝑃
𝑗
)). The inputs of the integration
Table 1: Sensors integration table.
𝑆
1
∗ 𝑆
2
∗ 𝑃
𝑗
1
(𝑋, 𝑌)† 𝑃
𝑗
2
(𝑋, 𝑌)† 𝑃
𝑗
3
(𝑋, 𝑌)† ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑃
𝑗
𝑖
(𝑋, 𝑌)†
𝐿
1
∗
𝐿
2
∗
𝐹‡ 𝐹‡ 𝑋‡ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝐹‡
𝐿
1
∗
𝐿
2
∗ 𝑁‡ 𝑋‡ 𝐹‡ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑋‡
𝐿
1
∗ 𝐿
2
∗
𝑋‡ 𝑋‡ 𝑁‡ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑁‡
𝐿
1
∗ 𝐿
2
∗ 𝐹‡ 𝑁‡ 𝐹‡ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑁‡
table 𝑌 and the sensors expected readings of each place of
the normal branch must be compared; that is, if the sensor
readings and the expected readings are the same, then ℎ
1
(𝑃
𝑗
)
is classified as normal𝑁. Moreover, the readings can lead to
fault 𝐹 or to indeterminate𝑋when they have no information
to use. Consider 𝑌
𝑗
= 𝑌
𝑗𝑁
∪ 𝑌
𝑗𝐹
∪ 𝑌
𝑗𝑋
. The results of this
classification are marked with “‡” in Table 1.
Step 4.5 (replace the fault transitions and remove the places
which are not reachable). The fault transitions of the PN gen-
eral model𝑄𝑗 have to be replaced by the sensor readings.The
fault places that cannot be identified because the information
available does not allow enabling the market of that place
must be removed of 𝑄𝑗. ∀𝑝
𝑖
: 𝑝
𝑖
∈ 𝑃 → 𝑀(𝑃
𝑖
) ∉ 𝑅(𝑄,𝑚
0
).
Finally, the refined integration model of each subsystem
is made up of normal places 𝑝𝑗
𝑖
= 𝑝1
𝑖
∪ 𝑝2
𝑖
∪ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∪ 𝑝𝑁
𝑖
and fault places 𝑝
𝑓
given in Π
𝑓
, 𝑝𝑗 = 𝑝𝑗
𝑁
∪ 𝑝
𝑗
𝐹
. Transition
𝑇𝑗 includes control events 𝑇
𝐶
and those considered in the
integration table 𝑇
𝑆
; consider 𝑇 = 𝑇
𝐶
∪ 𝑇
𝑆
. In conclusion,
the refined model of each subsystem will be composed only
by observable events.
Step 5 (create the diagnoser). The diagnoser is a PN that is
implemented considering the refined model of the system.
Let 𝑄𝑗 = (𝑃𝑗, 𝑇𝑗,Pre𝑗,Post𝑗, 𝑚𝑗
0
) be the PN that represents
the refined model of each one of the subsystems 𝐻
𝑗
of the
whole system (𝑗 = 1, . . . ,𝑀) and 𝑡
𝑓
the final transition from
a sequence 𝑆, defined as follows:
L (𝑇
𝑓𝑖
) = {𝑆𝑡
𝑓
∈ 𝐿 : 𝑡
𝑓
∈ 𝑇} . (7)
L(𝑇
𝑓𝑖
) denotes a set of all sequences of 𝐿 (languages rep-
resenting system behavior) that end in a fault transition,
belonging to the class 𝑡
𝑓𝑖
. Consider 𝑡
𝑓
∈ 𝑇 and 𝑆 ∈ 𝑇∗. The
notation 𝑡 ∈ 𝑆 is used to denote that 𝑡 is a transition of the
sequence 𝑆, also writing 𝑡
𝑓
∈ 𝑇 to any 𝑡
𝑓
.
In addition to this, a label has to be assigned to each
system fault, producing a set of fault labels defined according
to the expression Δ𝐹 = {𝐹
1
, 𝐹
2
, . . . , 𝐹
𝑚
}.
In general, a set of labels Δ is made up of normal labels𝑁
and fault labels 𝐹; thus Δ = {𝑁} ∪ {𝐹}.
In general, the diagnoser for system𝐻 is a PN of the form
𝑄
𝑑
= (𝑃
𝑑
, 𝑇
𝑑
,Pre,Post, 𝑚
0
, 𝑝, 𝑡, 𝑡end), such that
(i) 𝑃
𝑑
= {𝑃
1
, 𝑃
2
, . . . , 𝑃
𝑛
} is a finite, nonempty set of places;
(ii) 𝑇
𝑑
= {𝑇
1
, 𝑇
2
, . . . , 𝑇
𝑚
} is a finite, nonempty set of
transitions;
(iii) 𝑃 ∩ 𝑇 = 0; that is, the sets 𝑃 and 𝑇 are disjointed;
(iv) Pre:𝑃×𝑇 → {1, 0} is the input incidence application;
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(v) Post: 𝑇 × 𝑃 → {1, 0} is the output incidence
application;
(vi) 𝑚
0
is the initial marked;
(vii) 𝑝
0
is the starting place,
(viii) 𝑡
0
is the starting transition;
(ix) 𝑡end is the ending transition.
The set of places 𝑃
𝑑
of the diagnoser is an extension of the
set of places of general model. Thus, a place 𝑝 of 𝑄
𝑑
is of the
form (𝑝
𝑖
, 𝑙
𝑖
)where places belong to observable places,𝑝
𝑖
∈ 𝑃
0
,
and the label 𝑙
𝑖
belongs to labels set Δ. The labels for a specific
place will be of the form 𝑙
𝑖
= {𝑁} ∨ {𝐹}. Therefore, a place 𝑃
𝑑
can take a label either of normal or fault operation.
The functions essential for building the diagnoser are as
follows.
Label Assignation function LA: 𝑃
𝑜
× Δ × 𝑇∗ → Δ. Given
𝑝 ∈ 𝑃
𝑜
, 𝑙 ∈ Δ, and 𝑠 ∈ 𝐿(𝑄, 𝑝), LA assigns the label 𝑙 over
𝑠 (transitions sequences) starting from 𝑝 and following the
dynamics of 𝑄, according to
LA (𝑃, 𝐿, 𝑆) =
{
{
{
{𝑁} 𝑠𝑖 ∀𝑖 [𝑇
𝑓𝑖
∉ 𝑆]
{𝐹} 𝑠𝑖 ∀𝑖 [𝑇
𝑓𝑖
∈ 𝑆] .
(8)
This mean that PN diagnoser 𝑄
𝑑
assigns to each place its
respective label, depending on the transition fired, it will be
𝑁 (normal) if 𝑇
0
is fired in the sequence 𝑆 or it will be 𝐹
𝑖
if it
has been fired in a fault transition 𝑇
𝑓
.
It should be pointed out that sink places appear in the
integration model 𝑄𝑗. If marking fell into a sink place, the
PN would be blocked. In order to avoid this problem, a fault
expanding (FE) function has to be created, taking advantage
of the concurrence capabilities of the PN.
Consequently, the fault expanding function is defined
according to the following expression: EF: 𝑅
𝑁
× 𝐹
𝑖
→ 𝑅
𝐹
,
where 𝑅
𝑁
is the normal operating branch and 𝑅
𝐹
is the fault
operating branch. For each set of failure 𝐹
𝑖
, a new branch
of failures in the PN will be created so as to fulfill the role
of overseeing the failures individually. The diagnoser 𝑄
𝑑
will
have asmany branches as the number of faults the system has.
𝑅
𝐺
specifies the total number of branches of the diagnoser:
𝑅
𝑄𝑑
=
𝑀
∑
𝑖=1
𝑅
𝑓𝑖
. (9)
The procedure for creation of the diagnoser is as follows.
Step 5.1. Define the initial place 𝑝
0
.
Step 5.2 (add a starting transition 𝑡
0
). Connect 𝑝
0
to 𝑡
0
by
using an arc.
Step 5.3 (add an ending transition 𝑡end). Connect 𝑡end to 𝑝 by
using an arc.
Step 5.4 (add the fault branch). For each fault of Π
𝑓𝑖
, a fault
branch is built according to the fault expanding function
EF. Each branch includes a normal branch parallel to a fault
branch since each place can fire a fault transition 𝑡
𝑓
or normal
transition 𝑡
𝑁
. When a 𝑡
𝑓
is fired, the PND goes to a fault place
𝑝
𝑓
and consequently LA function assigns a label. In order to
continue the evolution of the PN, the sensors reading plus
control transition must be fired (𝑇
𝑆
+ 𝑇
𝐶
).
Step 5.5 (add recovery transitions 𝑡
𝑅
). For each one of the
fault places, its evolution can go in away of normal conditions
(step before) or sensor readings can change from fault state
to normal state. Therefore, a recovery transition 𝑡
𝑅
must be
added to the branch and the mark of place must return to
normal place priorly:
(∀𝑝
𝑓𝑖
∈ 𝑃
𝐹
) (∃𝑡
𝑅𝑖
∈ 𝑇
𝑅
: 𝑡 = 𝑡
𝑆
)
⋅ (𝑝
𝑓𝑖
× 𝑡
𝑅𝑖
󳨀→ 𝑝
𝑁(𝑖−1)
) .
(10)
Step 5.6 (connect 𝑡
0
and 𝑡end to the branches). An arc must be
connected from 𝑡
0
to each initial place of the branch and, in
the same way, from each initial place of the branch to 𝑡end.
In this step, weighting arcs are used for avoiding conflicts
in the PN; therefore, the weight of the arc must be equal to
the number of faults plus one (corresponding to the normal
branch of its respective subsystem).
Step 5.7 (temporal dynamics for diagnosing intermittent
faults). For each fault place, a time variable 𝑡 is added. It is
started when the mark arrives to the fault place and ends
when the mark goes out because the recovery transitions are
fired. This time stored by 𝑡 must be added to another when
the branch falls in fault. ∀𝑝
𝑓𝑖
∈ 𝑃
𝐹
, ∃𝑡 → 𝑝
𝑓𝑖
= (𝑀(𝑝
𝑖
), 𝑡
𝑖
),
where 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑍, with 𝑍 being the numbers of faults of the
system. For each fault branch of the diagnoser, a temporal
account place 𝑝
𝐶
is added. When a fault transition is fired,
a mark must be added to 𝑝
𝐶
. This means that the numbers
of faults are stored into this place 𝑝
𝐶
. And the sum of the
times registered by 𝑡 variable is stored in 𝑝
𝐶
. Then, from each
fault transition of the fault branch, an arc must be connected
to temporal account place 𝑝
𝐶
. The numbers of marks in the
temporal account place is the sum of the marks registered in
each fault place:
∀𝑅
𝐹
∈ 𝑅,
∃𝑝
𝐶
: 𝑡
𝑓𝑖
󳨀→ 𝑝
𝐶
, ∧,
𝑡 =
𝑀
∑
𝑖=1
𝑡
𝑖
,
𝑚 (𝑝
𝐶
) =
𝑍
∑
𝑖=1
𝑚(𝑝
𝑓𝑖
) ,
𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑍.
(11)
Step 5.8 (reset of temporal dynamic). When the operator (i.e.,
the pilot) stops the diagnoser to replace or fix a component,
the variables 𝑡 and temporal account place 𝑝
𝐶
must be
resetting. An arc must be added from 𝑝
𝐶
to 𝑡end for this
purpose. Another arc starting from 𝑡end but without place for
arrival should be also added.The weight of this arc is equal to
numbers of marks stores in 𝑝
𝐶
. In this manner, 𝑝
𝐶
is empty
(no marks) and 𝑡 variable is set to zero.
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Figure 2: Subsystems of the helicopter.
PN diagnoser evaluates possible changes in each branch.
The diagnoser emerges in normal or failure operation accord-
ing to LA function. The diagnoser evaluates each fault
separately and takes into account the failures that are caused
by other failures in their transitions; therefore it is able
to detect failures simultaneously, regardless of the order in
which they occur.
4. Application to Helicopter
A radio controlled helicopter model Vario Benzin Trainer
was chosen for this study. It relies on six servo-controllers
for maneuvering. It has a length of 1.46 meters, a wingspan
of 2 meters, and a weight of 7.3 Kg. The system (helicopter)
is made up of three main subsystems: engine, main rotor
(known as plate), and tail rotor. If any of them fails, the
mission unavoidably has to be aborted, because the helicopter
could crash with serious consequences rapidly.
The motor system is made up of a small gasoline engine
and a servo that controls the throttle. It is responsible for
generating the rotation of blades, both main rotor and tail
rotor, in a mechanically settled proportional relationship. An
electronic controller is typically used to maintain the speed
of the rotor constant, independently of the attack angle of the
blades. This angle is directly related to the drag that engine
has to overcome.
The main rotor system is controlled by four servos. They
allow modifying the lift and helicopter attitude (i.e., the roll
and pitch angles) by varying the collective and cyclic pitch
of the blades along their rotation. Thus, the collective pitch
varies the lift and the cyclic one modifies the attitude.
Themain component of the tail rotor system (antitorque)
is a servo-controller, which receives commands from the pilot
in order to modify the pitch angle of the tail rotor blades.The
variation of this angle allows modifying the yaw angle of the
helicopter (heading), mainly because it varies the antitorque
that is required to compensate the one generated by the main
rotor.
The full system relies on additional devices, such as power
supply, navigation sensors (i.e., inertial systems, tail gyro,
GPS, and electronic compass), controllers, communications
(antennas and radios), and the ground control station.
The following lines are dedicated to describe the diag-
noser implementation for the helicopter, according to the
process described in previous sections. It is worth stressing
that the no faults have been considered in the controller.
4.1. Classification in Subsystems. The helicopter is classified
into three fundamental subsystems, as Figure 2 highlights,
namely, the motor subsystem 𝐻
1
, the main rotor subsystem
𝐻
2
, and tail rotor subsystem𝐻
3
.
4.2. Building the PN Model of the Components of
Each Subsystem
Subsystem Motor 𝐻
1
. This subsystem has two components to
model: controller 𝐻1
1
and throttle servo 𝐻2
1
. The monitored
variables are fuel flow (𝐹), engine temperature (𝑇), engine
speed (RPM), and current required by the throttle servo (𝐼1).
The faults to diagnose are high temperature of the motor:
Fault Warming Motor (FWM), lack of gasoline in the fuel
tank: Fault Level Flow (FLF), and failure of servo stuck (FSS1).
Therefore, the set of faults for motor subsystem is 𝐹1 =
{FWM, FLF, FSS1}.
Figure 3 shows the PN model of the controller and servo.
The PNmodel of the controller represents its cyclic work that
is represented by the place𝐶1. If the transitionAS1 (activation
servo 1) is activated, it will move to place 𝐶2 (new location).
When the transition AS2 is activated, the model will return
to 𝐶1, representing a new location. In the same way, in
the motor servo PN model, SNA1 represents servo normal
operation. When transition AS1 is activated in synchrony
with the controller, the model moves to SR1. Finally, when
the transition AS2 is activated, the PN returns to SNA1. The
rest of the branches represent faults of the subsystem, which
are depicted by using dark places and transition, due to being
unobservable.
Main Rotor Subsystem𝐻
2
. As previouslymentioned, there are
two components to model in the plate subsystem, namely,
plate servos and controller. The monitored variables are
currents required by plate servos (𝐼2, 𝐼3, 𝐼4, 𝐼5), roll and pith
angles (𝑅𝑙, 𝑃𝑡), and the vibrations in tail (𝐺). The faults
considered in the diagnoser are failure of servos stuck (FSS2,
FSS3, FSS4, and FSS5) and mechanical imbalance of the
chassis (FM). Therefore, the set of faults for main plate
subsystem is as follows: 𝐹2 = {FSS2, FSS3, FSS4, FSS5, FM}.
Tail Rotor Subsystem𝐻
3
. Two components have been consid-
ered in the model: tail servo and controller. The monitored
variables are current required by tail servo (𝐼6) and yaw angle
(𝑌𝑤). The fault to diagnose is a failure of servo stuck in the
tail FSS6. Subsequently, the set of faults is defined as follows:
𝐹3 = {FSS6}.
4.3. Operation of Integration
Motor Subsystem. It consists in joining in a single model
the two models of the previous step. The initial place 𝑃0 =
{𝐶1; SNA1} is the union of the initial places of controller (𝐶1)
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Figure 3: PN model of the components, motor subsystem.
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Figure 4: General PN model of motor subsystem.
and servo (SNA1). 𝑃1 integrates the places of the controller
(𝐶2) and servo (SRA1).The rest of the components of the PN
models are kept. General model can be seen in Figure 4.
Main Rotor Subsystem. An initial place 𝑃2 = {𝐶3; SNA2} has
been defined as the union of the initial places of controller𝐶3
and current action of the servos SNA2; SNA3; SNA4; SNA5.
Normal branch has been built. Fault places and transitions
have been added for each fault of the set 𝐹2. 𝑃3 integrates
the places of the controller 𝐶4 and required action of servo
SRA2; SRA3; SRA4; SRA5.
Tail Rotor Subsystem. As in previous cases, an initial place
𝑃4 = {𝐶5; SNA6} has been defined as the union of the initial
places of controller 𝐶5 and current action of the tail servo
SNA6. After defining the normal branch, fault places and
transitions have been added for each fault of the set 𝐹3. 𝑃5
integrates the places of the controller 𝐶6 and required action
of servo SRA6.
4.4. Refining the General Model
4.4.1. Identify the Sensor for Each Subsystem 𝑁𝑠 according to
the Sensors Required for Monitoring the Desired Variables. As
previously mentioned, motor sensors’ set is made up of a
fuel flow sensor 𝐹, a temperature sensor 𝑇, a speed sensor
(encoder) RPM, and current servo of fuel 𝐼1. The set 𝑁𝑠 for
the engine subsystem is therefore defined as follows: 𝑁𝑠1 =
{𝐹, 𝑇,RPM, 𝐼1}.
Following the same procedure, the main rotor sensor set
is 𝑁𝑠2 = {𝐼2, 𝐼3, 𝐼4, 𝐼5, 𝑅𝑙, 𝑃𝑡, 𝐺}, which is made up of four
current sensors for the servos of the plate (𝐼2, 𝐼3, 𝐼4, 𝐼5),
an inertial sensor that estimates the roll and pitch angles
(𝑅𝑙, 𝑃𝑡), and an accelerometer formeasuring vibrations in the
frame 𝐺. Finally, tail rotor sensor comprises two sensors, a
current sensor of the tail servo 𝐼6 and magnetic compass for
estimating the heading or yaw angle 𝑌𝑤. Subsequently, set is
𝑁𝑠3 = {𝐼6, 𝑌𝑤}.
4.4.2. Build a Discrete Set of the Sensors Outputs. The com-
binations of sensor readings that have to be used as inputs of
the sensors integration table are shown in Table 2.
According to previous definitions, motor subsystem has
|𝑌
1
| = 2𝑁𝑠 = 24 = 16 combinations. According to this
formulation, main rotor subsystem has |𝑌
2
| = 16 combi-
nations (notice that the four sensors’ current of the plate is
represented just by a single value: 𝐼𝑠). Tail rotor subsystemhas
therefore |𝑌
3
| = 4. Each reading is measurement in a discrete
way and a threshold has been independent.
4.4.3. Define the Outputs of the Integration Table. Two out-
puts have been added for the motor subsystem, namely, 𝑃0
and 𝑃1. Under normal operating conditions, the reading of
fuel must be 𝐹 (i.e., the fuel in the tank is above theminimum
threshold of 100mL), the reading of the temperature must be
𝑇 (i.e., the engine temperature is below the threshold, 90∘C),
the value for the speed of the rotor must be RPM (i.e., the
engine revolutions are over the threshold of 1200 rpm), and
the readings from the servo current should be 𝐼 (i.e., the
servos demand a value of current from 100 to 600mA, which
denotes normal functioning instead of blockage problems).
MainRotor Subsystem. Two outputs have been included in the
table for 𝑃2 and 𝑃3. The readings of current sensors 𝐼𝑠 must
be in the same range of that of the servos of the plate (different
values happened if a more powerful servo would be used to
control the tail). The motor subsystems and the readings of
the position angles (roll and pitch) must be 𝑅𝑙, 𝑃𝑡 (i.e., angle
below 45∘) and vibrations must be 𝐺 (i.e., vibrations below
2.5 g).
Tail Rotor Subsystem. Two outputs have been incorporated to
the table for 𝑃4 and 𝑃5. The readings of the current servo
must be 𝐼6 and the readings of the yaw angle must be𝑌𝑤.The
outputs of the integration table are represented in Table 3.
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Table 2: Outputs’ sensor set.
Combinations Motor readings Plate readings Tail rotor readings
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺 𝐼6 𝑌𝑤
1 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺 𝐼6 𝑌𝑤
2 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺 𝐼6 𝑌𝑤
3 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺 𝐼6 𝑌𝑤
4 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺 𝐼6 𝑌𝑤
5 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺
6 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺
7 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺
8 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺
9 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺
10 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺
11 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺
12 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺
13 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺
14 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺
15 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺
16 𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺
Table 3: Outputs’ set of the integration table.
Readings motor Motor places
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝑃0(𝐹, 𝑇,RPM, 𝐼) 𝑃1(𝐹, 𝑇,RPM, 𝐼)
Plate readings Plate places
𝐼𝑠 𝑅𝑙 𝑃𝑡 𝐺 𝑃2(𝐼𝑠, 𝑅𝑙, 𝑃𝑡, 𝐺) 𝑃3(𝐼𝑠, 𝑅𝑙, 𝑃𝑡, 𝐺)
Tail rotor readings Tail rotor places
𝐼6 𝑌𝑤 𝑃4(𝐼6, 𝑌𝑤) 𝑃5(𝐼6, 𝑌𝑤)
4.4.4. Build the Sensors Integration Table. Thesensor readings
𝑌 have to be cross-checked with their corresponding normal
operations of the place for each subsystem. This allows
determining whether sensors readings indicate a fault 𝐹, a
normal behavior 𝑁 or which combinations of sensors will
provide with undetermined information to the diagnosis
system𝑋.
The integration table of motor subsystem is showed in
Table 4. This step requires a deep knowledge of the system.
4.4.5. Replace the Faults Transitions and Remove the Places
which are Not Reachable. This step consists in replacing
transitions unobservable (fault transitions) by sensors read-
ings identified in the integration table. Motor subsystems:
transition FLF is replaced by 𝐹, the transition FWM is
replaced by 𝑇, and the transition FSS1 is replaced by (RPM +
𝐼1). Main rotor subsystem: any fault of the stuck servo FSS is
replaced by the readings of the 𝐼𝑠 + 𝑅𝑙 + 𝑃𝑡 and the mechanic
fault FM is replaced by 𝐺. The refined PN of the motor is
shown in Figure 5. Tail rotor subsystem: fault of the servo
stuck FSS6 is replaced by the readings of 𝐼6 + 𝑌𝑤.
4.5. Building of the Diagnoser. Finally, the whole algorithm
is integrated in one single PN, the FD helicopter. The PN
that represents the diagnoser is mainly composed of three
T
T
AS1
AS2FLF
FWM
FSS1
P0
P1
F
F
RPM + I
RPM + I
Figure 5: Refined PN model of the motor.
branches, corresponding to each subsystem: motor, main
rotor, and tail rotor branches, as Figure 6 depicts. An
initial place 𝑝
0
for starting and starting transition 𝑡
0
have
been defined. The starting transition 𝑡
0
has to be activated
manually by the operator in the ground control station so
as to start the diagnoser. This moves a token for each of
the branches of the helicopter subsystems. Likewise, the PN
diagnoser has an ending transition 𝑡end, which allows the
pilot to finish the diagnoser. The refined PN models of each
subsystem are joined to the diagnoser with their places and
transitions, respectively; then, based on the functions of fault
expansion EF, the fault braches are added for each subsystem.
Recovery transitions 𝑡
𝑅
for each one of the fault places of each
subsystem are added, connecting with the previous normal
place. Consequently, each one of the transitions and places
has to be connected by arcs, considering that their weights
are equal to the numbers of faults plus one (normal branch).
Finally, the temporal dynamic must be implemented adding
the temporal account places 𝑝
𝐶
, which is used for storing the
time and number of fault for each variable of the system.
The diagnoser makes an online assessment of whole
system and serves as the supervisor, indicating whether a
branch falls into failure by means of the label assigned
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Table 4: Integration table of the motor subsystem.
Sensors readings Motor places
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝑃0(𝐹, 𝑇,RPM, 𝐼) 𝑃1(𝐹, 𝑇,RPM, 𝐼)
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 FLF 𝑁 FSS1 𝑁 FLF 𝑁 FSS1 𝑁
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 FLF 𝑁 FSS1 FSS1 FLF 𝑁 FSS1 FSS1
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 FLF 𝑁 𝑁 𝑁 FLF 𝑁 𝑁 𝑁
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 FLF 𝑁 𝑁 FSS1 FLF 𝑁 𝑁 FSS1
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 FLF FWM FSS1 𝑁 FLF FWM FSS1 𝑁
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 FLF FWM FSS1 FSS1 FLF FWM FSS1 FSS1
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 FLF FWM 𝑁 𝑁 FLF FWM 𝑁 𝑁
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 FLF FWM 𝑁 FSS1 FLF FWM 𝑁 FSS1
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝑁 𝑁 FSS1 𝑁 𝑁 𝑁 FSS1 𝑁
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝑁 𝑁 FSS1 FSS1 𝑁 𝑁 FSS1 FSS1
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝑁 𝑁 𝑁 𝑁 𝑁 𝑁 𝑁 𝑁
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝑁 𝑁 𝑁 FSS1 𝑁 𝑁 𝑁 FSS1
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝑁 FWM FSS1 𝑁 𝑁 FWM FSS1 𝑁
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝑁 FWM FSS1 FSS1 𝑁 FWM FSS1 FSS1
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝑁 FWM 𝑁 𝑁 𝑁 FWM 𝑁 𝑁
𝐹 𝑇 RPM 𝐼1 𝑁 FWM 𝑁 FSS1 𝑁 FWM 𝑁 FSS1
Main rotor branch
Tail rotor branch
2
6
54
4
T
Motor branch
F
2
G
FM
pC2
pC2
pC3
pC3
FWM
FSS1
AS1
AS2
FLL
FSS5FSS4
FSS3
AS3
FSS2
AS4
tend
tend
AS5
AS6
FSS6
pC1
pC1
(P0, N)
(P1, N)
(P2, N)
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F
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G
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I4 + Rl + Pt
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I2 ∙ Rl ∙ PtI3 ∙ Rl ∙ Pt
I4 ∙ Rl ∙ Pt
I5 ∙ Rl ∙ Pt
(P0, N)
Figure 6: Petri Net diagnoser.
by function LA. If this happens, the other branches con-
tinue assessing the system, although, due to vulnerabil-
ity of the helicopter, it should be landed for repairing
immediately.
Sometimes, small faults happen during a flight for short
periods of time. If no additional action is provided, the
recovery transitions will hide these faults to the operator.
The diagnoser relies on a display to show the operator this
kind of information.
5. Analysis of Results
A series of field missions has been carried out in order to
evaluate the PNdiagnoser performance. Several lab tests were
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Table 5: Thresholds for monitored signals of the UAV.
Variable Symbol V. Normal (1) V. Fault (0)
Temperature 𝑇 𝑇 (ambient) to 90∘C >90∘C
Voltage 𝑉 6.5–7V <6V
Fuel flow 𝐹 100–500mL <50mL
RPMs RPM 1200–1500 rpm <1200 rpm
Vibrations 𝐺 0.5–2.5 g >2.5 g
Servos current 𝐼𝑠 100–600mA >600mA
Roll/pitch angles 0 𝑅𝑙/𝑃𝑡 < 45∘ >45 degrees
previously carried out in order to set up the thresholds for
the variables that determine the normal operation of the
helicopter. A summary of the variables threshold in each of
the variables is shown in Table 5.
Diverse types of failures were intentionally introduced in
the systemduring the field tests. Namely, different unbalances
were introduced both in main and in tail rotor, aiming at
increasing the vibrations of the helicopter frame. Moreover,
several problems in the engine carburetor were also induced
(e.g., the fuel flow was restricted to the engine).
A complete Data Acquisition System (DAQ) has been
designed and built so as to implement the diagnoser. It
is made up of two main components: the instrumentation
onboard the helicopter and the components running into
the ground control station (GCS). Since DAQ has been built
for providing data and housing to the PND algorithm, it is
responsible for sensing the field variables of the helicopter
and sending the information to the GCS. This information
is used to feed the fault diagnosis algorithm; which monitors
the normal or fault operation of the aircraft by using the
diagnoser Petri Net. The PND reports the frequency with
which any device on the aircraft falls into alarm or fault.
A LabVIEW module that contains a graphical interface
is responsible for acquiring, storing, and displaying all data
from the UAV. The DAQ system works in parallel and
independently of the control system; therefore it is fully
autonomous and does not share any resources with the
aircraft. This allows using the system with any other UAV.
Moreover, since there is a redundancy in the information (i.e.,
position and attitude), a simple comparisonmethod could be
useful to detect malfunctioning of the navigation systems.
It is worth noting that the tests required to evaluate the
performance of the diagnoser are extremely risky since they
require forcing real failures during the flights. Furthermore,
some difficulties are commonly found when working with
real-time systems that have to be shipped on a vehicle
with an extremely limited payload (e.g., data processing and
storing limitations and consumption of computing elements).
Additional problems arise when the information should be
transmitted to ground station (noise, range of communica-
tions, and limited bandwidth). Therefore, it is essential to
be as pragmatic as possible; that is, the maximum sampling
time should be used and only the essential discrete variables
monitored.
Another important limitation is the reaction time that the
pilot requires to decide if a mission has to be aborted when
a warning/fault is detected. The UAS operator could observe
during this period of time how a monitored variable falls
into alarm (warning) and, in some cases, into fault for short
periods of time, and recover the normal condition.
A summary report corresponding to the results obtained
during real flights (normal, vibrations in main and tail rotor,
and wrong mix in fuel) is shown in Table 6. It reveals the
number of times that each variable exceeded the threshold
during the mission. For instance, in the normal conditions
flight, the vibrations exceeded 93 times the value of the
2.5 g.
The behavior of the flight in normal conditions is showed
for temperature, vibrations, and RPM variables in Figure 7. It
can be concluded that those variables deserve specialmention
over the others. Each flight stage is referred to by numbers;
for example, take off is denoted by stage 2. Although RPM
and vibration thresholds exceeded intermittently their failure
thresholds during the flight, no warning was activated. The
RPM value highlights changes during takeoff and landing
stages. Vibrations during idle stage (motor started but UAV
on the ground) exceeded the thresholds of fault; nevertheless
they recover their normal range during the flight.
The helicopter safety strongly depends on its suitable
mechanical performance, and the expertise of the pilot
supported by this diagnoser is the best indicator to decide
whether a mission should be aborted or not.
6. Conclusions
This research addresses the fault diagnosis applied to an UAS
by using Petri Nets. Amethodological process for creating the
model and the diagnoser has been presented.The process has
been split into subsystems. This allows assessing the failures
in an independent way.
As result highlights, the created PetriNet diagnoser is able
to detect not only permanent but also intermittent failures,
providing the pilot with a set of health monitoring alarms.
The main advantages of the proposed method are the
ability to be implemented in complex processes, the flexibility
to make changes (i.e., including additional devices to the
diagnoser), the reduction of the combinational explosion,
and a systematic construction.
An application on a real system (a radio controlled
helicopter) has been presented as demonstrator. Since the
helicopter is a quite vulnerable platform, it requires a robust
fault diagnosis method. Although real experiments pose a
high risk, a valuable amount of flights have been carried
out in order to assess the performance of the algorithm
and methodology. Moreover, the use of a commonly used
tool such as LabVIEW allows providing the diagnoser with
additional features that turn out to be of great importance for
preventive maintenance.
This work opens the door to some fields of development
in the area of the FD to be considered in further work, such as
to perform spectral analysis of vibration aiming at detecting
more types of mechanical damages. Moreover it could be
applied to generate mathematical models of normal and fault
operation of the aircraft.
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Table 6: Summary of the helicopter behavior in missions.
Variable #Normal F #F Vib Plato #F Vib Cola #F Mix
Temperature 𝑇 0 0 0 0
Voltage 𝑉 0 0 0 0
Fuel flow 𝐹 0 0 0 0
RPMs RPM 6 10 3 25
Vibrations 𝐺 93 28 26 53
Servos current 𝐼𝑠 0 1 0 0
Roll/pitch/yaw angles 0 0 0 0 0
(1) Idle
1 2 3 4 5
6
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Figure 7: UAV variables flying in normal conditions.
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